


# CSE 40567 / 60567: Computer Security



## Security Basics 2

# State of the Security Landscape

# Social Engineering



# Low-hanging fruit

## **A dialogue:**

sysadmin: “Yeah, this is systems engineering.”

caller: “Hi, this is Bob Wells from the sales team, I’m trying to log into our portal from a customer’s site, and I left my dang credentials back at the office.”

sysadmin: “OK. To verify your identity, I’ll need your UID, social security num...”

caller: “Look buddy, I don’t have time for all of that, you want to explain to corporate how you blew a \$10M deal by making my customer walk out while I play 20 questions?”

sysadmin: \*sigh\* “Here’s your password...”

# A little reconnaissance improves the execution




- Need info on your mark? The BMV is your best friend
  - Old PI trick
  - Address, Phone Number, Date of Birth, Make and Model of Car

# Get hired as a janitor

- Physical access to target facility
  - Access to computers
  - Handwritten passwords in vicinity of workstations
  - You're handling the trash — a trove of useful information
  - Plant thumb-drives with malware



# Software can be an effective social engineer



# Why are attacks that target the user so hard to defend against?

Human errors made while considering a security regime fall into three categories:


1. Slips and lapses at the level of skill
2. Mistakes at the level of rules
3. Mistakes at the cognitive level



# Slips and lapses at the level of skill

Inattention can cause a practiced action to be caused instead of an intended one.

Example:



Danny Sullivan © BY 2.0 Google/Firefox Phishing Warning

# Mistakes at the level of rules

Actions people take by following rules are open to errors when they follow the wrong rule

Example: tricky URL

<https://www.citibank.secureauthenticion.com>

# Mistakes at the cognitive level

Many of us simply don't understand the problem

Example: picture-in-picture attack




Image Credit:  
<https://www.clerkendweller.uk/2009/9/15/Picture-in-Picture-Phishing-Attacks-and-Operating-System-Styles>

# Our Guiding Philosophy of Security

Fundamentally, computer hacking is a social problem that cannot be addressed entirely by technology

# Risk Mitigation

Assume that any system can be compromised


Security systems have many components and connections

Some of these are unknown to the designers, implementors and users

Our best strategy: **lessen** the risk of attack

# Risk Mitigation

**Security involves processes:**



Preventative  
technologies




Detection and  
Reaction



Forensic  
Systems

# Security through obscurity is not good security

- Many people think that a security system becomes more secure if its internal structure is secret
  - Example: A secret encryption algorithm



BUT: The exact opposite is the case



# Kerckhoffs' principle

“The security of a cryptographic system shall always and only depend on the secrecy of the key. Everything about the algorithm except for the keys shall be open.”

# Kerckhoffs' principle

- Open and standardized systems are subject to constant analysis by the international research community
- Secret systems can only be analyzed by internal specialists
  - ▶ Unless an agency or company has a huge budget, severe and constant analysis of internal security systems is not easy



Edward Snowden (cc)  
BY 3.0 Hic et nunc

# Extending Kerckhoffs' principle

Bruce Schneier: “Kerckhoffs' principle applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: every secret creates a potential failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness—and therefore something likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility.”




# Extending Kerckhoffs' principle

- Any system whose security depends on keeping the details of the system secret is not secure in the long run.
- **Defense in depth** suggests layers, some of which may contain secrets, but the core must be secure without them.
- Keeping the “algorithm” and key concepts secret increases the asymmetric information, potentially keeping even experts from evaluating the system without significant effort.

# Vulnerability Disclosure

What do we do if we find a bug that leads to system compromise?


➡ Ethical Dilemma



The controversy is not new: locksmiths worried about the same thing in the 19th century


# Non-disclosure

- Premise: vulnerability information helps attackers, and shouldn't be shared
- Situation in computer security up to the mid-1990s
  - Enforced via vendor legal intimidation and censorship



[http://attrition.org/errata/legal\\_threats/](http://attrition.org/errata/legal_threats/)

# Coordinated Disclosure



Microsoft's position: software vendors have right to control product vulnerability information

- Risk of sharing vulnerability with malicious parties is too high
- Vulnerability is disclosed after the patch is released

# Full disclosure

"We don't believe in security by obscurity, and as far as we know, full disclosure is the only way to ensure that everyone, not just the insiders, have access to the information we need."

- Leonard Rose (aka Terminus)

## **Without full disclosure:**

- Vendors have no incentive to release patches if there is no customer demand for them
- Sysadmins can't make informed decisions about risks to their systems
- Malicious individuals have a longer window to exploit a flaw