
CSE 40567 / 60567: Computer Security



Software Security 2

Homework #3 has been released. It is due 2/18 at 11:59PM


See **Assignments Page** on the course website for details

Midterm Exam: 2/27 (In Class) See Topics Checklist on Course Website

OS Authentication

Users

- A user is an identity tied to a single entity
- Specific systems may add additional constraints
- Systems represent user identity in a number of different ways
- The same system may use different representation of identity in different contexts




Good design principles for access control

- 1. Simplicity makes designs and mechanisms easy to understand
- 2. Simplicity reduces the potential for inconsistencies within a policy or set of policies
- 3. Restriction minimizes the power of an entity
- 4. Entities can communicate with other entities only when necessary
- 5. "Communication" is used in the widest possible sense, including that of imparting information by not communicating

Principle of Least Privilege

The *principle of least privilege* states that a subject should be given only those privileges that it needs in order to complete its task



Computer security rings BY-SA 3.0 User:Sven

Principle of Separation of Privilege

The *principle of separation of privilege* states that a system should not grant permission based on a single condition.

Example: Ubuntu Linux privilege escalation; user must be in group sudo to use sudo (8)


Entry in /etc/group: sudo:x:27:walter

```
walter@eve:~$ id
uid=1000(walter) gid=1000(walter)
groups=1000(walter),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo)
```


Principle of Least Common Mechanism

The *principle of least common mechanism* states that mechanisms used to access resources should not be shared.

Example: remote mobile virtualization



Basic OS Authentication



Has:

Password One-time password Biometric **Checks:** User list Credential list ID list

How we log in — in practice

Local (Unity):

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Login ubuntu ⓒ BY-SA 4.0 Ricardoborges

Remote (ssh):

\$ ssh walter@140.247.178.194
walter@140.247.178.194's password: xxxxxxx
Welcome to Ubuntu 12.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 3.2.0-88-generic x86 64)

Privilege Levels in Linux

Users have a corresponding ASCII username useradd (8) limits this to 32 characters in Ubuntu

The operating system identifies users by an integer known as a UID

Not all UIDs are created equally:

- root (0), the superuser
- daemon (1) and sys (3), handle some aspects of the network
- Ip (7), used for the printer system.
- mail (8), email delivery
- nobody (65534), owns no files and sometimes used as a default user for unprivileged operations

How is privilege enforced?

- OS System Calls
- Linux: getuid() returns the real user id of a calling process
- Example: attempt to kill a root owned process as a user

Target process: root 32661 0.0 0.0 21856 380 ? S Jan18 0:00 /sbin/udevd --daemon User attempts to kill it: walter@eve:~\$ kill -9 32661 -bash: kill: (32661) - Operation not permitted kill(2) checks the UID of the calling process and bails out: getpid() = 2391 kill(32661, SIGKILL) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)

su(1) and sudo(8)

- Logging in as root is considered to be dangerous these days
 - Block root ssh access via /etc/ssh/sshd_config
 PermitRootLogin no option
- An alternative: su to root
- A better alternative: only run one privileged command at a time
 - example: sudo service apache2 restart

Groups

- We saw that being in a special group facilitates sudo access
- Users often need to share resources
 - Systems facilitate this by putting users into groups
 - A group is an alias for a set of users
 - Two models: (1) users are assigned groups for the duration of their login session; (2) users can change from one group to another in the same session

Common group:

uid=1000(walter) gid=1000(walter) groups=1000(walter),4(adm),27(sudo),250(cvrl)

uid=1001(gabe) gid=1001(gabe) groups=1001(gabe),250(cvrl)

Linux auth model

Authentication looks simple when you do it, but things are more complicated behind the scenes

How user information is stored on the local system:


/etc/passwd — All user login information except for
the passwords

/etc/shadow — The encrypted passwords

/etc/passwd


root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh walter:x:1000:1000:Walter Scheirer,,,:/home/walter:/bin/bash sshd:x:115:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin dustin:x:1001:1002:,,,:/home/dustin:/bin/bash

/etc/shadow



Lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP)

Centralized network authentication simplifies user management:




LDAP Protocol

RFC 4511

- Protocol for accessing X.500-based directory services
- Designed to run over TCP/IP networks
- LDAP entry is a collection of attributes that has a globallyunique Distinguished Name (DN)
 - cn for common name (Walter Scheirer)
 - mail for email address (walter.scheirer@nd.edu)
- Entries are arranged in a hierarchical tree-like structure
 - Useful for arranging user records into an organization's structure

Role of x.500 in LDAP

In essence, LDAP is just an access protocol to an x.500 directory service



LDAP is commonly directly implemented in X.500 servers

Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)

- Provides authentication modules for applications
 - Solves problem of developers writing their own authentication modules
 - Suite of shared libraries with common configurations
- During authentication, program invokes library routine pam_authenticate
 - The routine accesses configuration files in /etc/pam.d
 - Example: sshd will access /etc/pam.d/sshd

/etc/pam.d/sshd

```
# Disallow non-root logins when /etc/nologin exists.
          required pam nologin.so
account
# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to set complex
# access limits that are hard to express in sshd config.
# account required
                       pam access.so
# Standard Un*x authorization.
@include common-account
# Standard Un*x session setup and teardown.
@include common-session
# Print the message of the day upon successful login.
session optional
                    pam motd.so # [1]
# Print the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login.
session optional pam mail.so standard noenv # [1]
# Set up user limits from /etc/security/limits.conf.
session required pam limits.so
# Set up SELinux capabilities (need modified pam)
# session required pam selinux.so multiple
# Read environment variables from /etc/environment and
# /etc/security/pam env.conf.
session required pam env.so # [1]
# In Debian 4.0 (etch), locale-related environment variables were moved to
# /etc/default/locale, so read that as well.
session
          required pam env.so user readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
```

PAM Configuration Files (1) (2) (3) account required pam nologin.so

- First field describes the auth. related mechanism treated by the line
- Second field controls the calling of the modules
 - required means failure of the module makes authentication fail
- Third field is the name of the module (dynamic library)

PAM Configuration Files

account session	required optional	pam_nologin.so pam_motd.so
session	optional	pam mail.so standard noenv
session	required	pam limits.so
session	required	pam_env.so
session	required	pam_env.so user_readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale

- Stacking: modules are invoked successively
- Configuration determines the order
 - Caller can make no assumptions about how the modules work
 - Authentication is in effect hidden from the application using PAM

SELinux

What if we uncomment this option?

Set up SELinux capabilities (need modified pam)
session required pam selinux.so multiple

- Gives users and administrators more access control than the base OS provides
- Access can be constrained on such variables as which users and applications can access which resources
- Access controls are determined by a policy
 - Can't be changed by careless users or misbehaving applications

http://selinuxproject.org/

SELinux

- Adds finer granularity to access controls
 - Control fundamental OS operations: you specify who can unlink, append only, move a file, etc.
 - Specify access for network resources and interprocess communication (IPC)
- **SELinux users** are not equivalent to Linux users
 - They cannot change via su or sudo
 - Many Linux users will use the same SELinux user
 - SELinux users that are generic have the suffix "_u", such as user_u.

SELinux

- SELinux roles are defined by the policy
 - Examples: unprivileged user, web administrator, database administrator
 - Objects have the role object_r
 - roles have the suffix "_r", such as user_r
- SELinux types are the primary means of determining access
 - a type has the suffix "_t", such as user_t

SELinux context framework

Contexts are attributes used to determine if access should be allowed between a process and an object

Contexts consist of 3 required fields and 1 optional field: user:role:type:range ← optional

Example with required fields:
system_u:system_r:xserver_t

Adding optional multi-level security: system_u:system_r:xserver_t:SystemLow-SystemHigh

SELinux object classes and rules

Object classes are used in the policy and in access decisions to more finely specify what access is allowed

file object class has the permissions *create*, *read*, *write*, and *unlink*

unix_stream_socket object class has the permissions *create*, *connect*, and *sendto*

Rules bring all of these elements together:

allow user_t user_home_t:file { create read write unlink };

More on file system security coming right up...